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Note
Qui Tam Suits: Defining the Rights and Roles
of the Government and the Relator Under
the False Claims Act
Gretchen L. Forney*
Lloyd T. Bortner learned that his employer, Philips Elec-
tronics North America Corporation (Philips), was illegally con-
cealing from the government its decision to withdraw from the
U.S. market and desert their U.S. dealers.- The government
relied on Philips's representations of continued participation in
the U.S. market2 when it purchased and leased equipment
from Philips worth millions of dollars.' After discovering the
fraudulent practices, Bortner filed suit against Philips on be-
half of the government under the qui tam4 provision of the
False Claims Act5 (FCA), which allows private citizens6 to bring
suit against those who knowingly defraud the U.S. government.
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1996,
University of South Carolina.
L See Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 155 (5th Cir.
1997). After determining the company could not bring adequate products to
the U.S. market, the executive committee decided to phase out of the market.
See Relators Second Amended Complaint at 6, Searcy (No. 1:95CV363). Philips
concealed this decision from the United States because it was Philips's largest
customer, and it was highly likely that the United States would have terminated
existing leases, returned equipment, and exposed Philips to a multimillion
dollar loss upon learning of Philips's plan to withdraw from the market. See
id. at 8-9.
2. Despite determining it could not expand its activities in the United
States, top executives continued to make representations that Philips would
"put up whatever it took to succeed in the United States market" and stated
the United States was an area where the company had to succeed. See id. at
13.
3. See Searcy, 117 F.3d at 155.
4. The phrase "qui tam" is short for "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso in hac parte sequitur," which is a Latin phrase interpreted as "who brings the
action for the king as well as for himself" United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes
Helicopters, Inn., 714 F. Supp. 1084,1086 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
5. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1994).
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As required by the statute, Bortner served the Attorney
General with the complaint and evidence under seal in order to
help the government decide whether or not to pursue the ac-
tion.7 Initially, the government decided not to intervene and
allowed Bortner to proceed individually.' During the year of
discovery, Bortner provided the government with all of the
court documents? Bortner and Philips made two unsuccessful
court-ordered attempts at mediation.10 After three days of
trial, the parties reached a settlement whereby the court would
enter a $1 million judgment against Philips." At this point,
despite its earlier inaction, the government sought to intervene
and block the settlement. 2
After the district court approved the settlement and de-
clined to allow the government to intervene, the government
appealed. 3 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, allowing the
government to intervene and veto the parties' settlement. The
court feared the "danger that a relator can boost the value of
settlement by bargaining away claims on behalf of the United
States."4 The court first determined the government had the
right to appeal. 5 It further found that the language of the
False Claims Act, which requires the consent of the Attorney
General before a FCA case is dismissed, 6 unambiguously gives
6. The private citizen who brings the suit is called the "relator" or "qui
tam plaintiff."





12. See id. The government opposed the settlement on the grounds that
the terms of the release were too broad. See id. For a case involving the op-
posite situation, where the government intervened in the qui tam action and
sought to settle the case against the relator's wishes to continue the action,
see United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co.,
912 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
13. See Searcy, 117 F.3d at 156.
14. Id. at 160. The court classified Bortner as a "relator who allegedly
wants to trade on the defendants' desire to maximize preclusive effects." Id.
15. The court used the test set out in EEOC v. Louisiana Office of Com-
munity Services, 47 F.3d 1438, 1442-43 (5th Cir. 1995). This test requires the
court to determine whether "the non-parties actually participated in the pro-
ceedings below, the equities weigh in favor of hearing the appeal, and the non-
parties have a personal stake in the outcome." Id.
16. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1994) ("The action may be dismissed only if
the court and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and
their reasons for consenting.").
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the Attorney General absolute power to veto voluntary settle-
ments between private parties.17
The False Claims Act" is the statutory formula for imposing
liability on persons or corporations who knowingly defraud the
government. 9 The FCA is enforced in one of two ways. Primary
responsibility for enforcing the Act is vested in the Attorney
General. 0 Under the FCA qui tam provision, private citizens
are given enforcement power; they have the ability to bring
false claim suits on behalf of the United States.2' Currently,
the government only enters about twenty-five percent of the
suits filed,' giving the qui tam plaintiff substantial power to
dictate the nature of the action. As qui tam plaintiffs devel-
oped more skill in conducting suits under the FCA, they have
been able to manipulate the action, furthering their own position
with a corresponding reduction in the government's recovery.2
This manipulation has caused tension between the relator and the
government, and has left the courts with the task of determining
the rights of the relator and the government in qui tam actions.
Courts have struggled to define the respective roles of the
government and the qui tam plaintiff in part because the stat-
ute itself has evolved over time. 4 Circuit courts are currently
17. See Searcy, 117 F.3d at 159-60.
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994).
19. See id § 3729(a)(1); infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (discussing
the elements of an FCA suit).
20. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a).
2L See id. § 3730(b).
22. See JAMES T. BLANCH ET AL., CITIzEN SuITs AND Qui TAM ACTIONs:
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY 140 (1996).
23. See Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir.
1997) ('The Killingsworth litigation demonstrates that relators can manipu-
late settlements in ways that unfairly enrich them and reduce benefits to the
government."). Consequently, the relationship between the relator and the
government often becomes strained if the qui tam suit is brought for purposes
of self-dealing. See Joseph P. Tomain, False Claims Act Litigation: Whistle-
blower Qui Tam Suits Against Contractors Who Cheat the Government, 47
ADMIN. L. REV. 299, 300 (1995) ('The relationship of the relator-plaintiff and
the government contains a plot twist. As recounted in False Claim Act Litiga-
tion, acute embarrassment, subtle collusion, stubborn pride, or some other
psychological glitch often causes the government to impede prosecution of
such lawsuits .... ").
24. See Tomain, supra note 23, at 300 (M[O]ver the history of the False
Claims Act, there has been an expansion and contraction of the rights of the
relator ..... ). There have typically been three areas of concern with the rela-
tor's role in the conduct of the litigation: (1) if the government does not inter-
vene, the qui tam plaintiff is directing the prosecution but proceeding in the
government's name; (2) if the government decides to intervene, the court must
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split over the issue of defining the rights of the parties in a qui
tam suit. Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Searcy-
that the government has absolute power to intervene in a qui
tam action and block settlements'--the Ninth Circuit has held
in United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp.16 that
the Attorney General's consent for dismissal is only needed
during the initial sixty-day period in which the government
must decide whether it wants to intervene." This split is not
surprising due to the aberrant methods courts have used in in-
terpreting the statute coupled with the myriad of challenges
the statute has faced on constitutional grounds.
This Note discusses the positions courts have taken con-
cerning the rights of the government and individual plaintiffs
in qui tam suits under the FCA and concludes that the Searcy
decision, giving the government absolute power to intervene in
a qui tam suit, undermines the original intent of the provision.
Part I addresses how the history of the FCA and the constitu-
tional challenges to the qui tam provision have led to the cur-
rent circuit split concerning the ability of the government to in-
tervene and block settlements between the qui tam plaintiff
and the defendant. Part II briefly examines the language of
the FCA and summarizes how statutory interpretation has
provided little guidance for the courts in deciphering the qui
tam provision. Part III analyzes the potential ramifications for
the qui tam provision if the Searcy decision is followed. This
Note concludes that the ultimate concerns of the court in both the
Searcy and Killingsworth decisions can be reconciled through
an intermediary ground that balances the rights of the qui tam
plaintiff and the government, while maintaining consistency
with the language and purpose of the FCA's qui tam provision.
I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: HISTORY AND CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS
The False Claims Act prohibits a wide variety of misconduct.
Fraud infiltrates essentially every government program-from
determine whether it has shown "good cause" to do so; and (3) if a dispute
arises between the relator and the government as to the conduct of suit, the
government can ask the court to limit the relator's participation. See United
States ex rel. Truong v. Northrop Corp., 728 F. Supp. 615, 621 (C.D. Cal.
1989).
25. See Searcy, 117 F.3d at 159.
26. 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 296 (1996).
27. See id. at 722.
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welfare and food stamps, to multibillion dollar defense pro-
curements, to crop subsidies and disaster relief programs."
The Department of Justice estimates that fraud drains ap-
proximately one to ten percent of the entire federal budget per
year.29 The types of activities covered by the Act range from of-
fering fraudulent invoices for reimbursement under a federally
funded program to submitting false statements in an applica-
tion for a government-guaranteed loan A person may be liable
under the FCA even though the person has no direct contrac-
tual relationship with the government." As long as the person
causes someone else to submit a false claim, the individual
may be liable.32 The primary elements for most FCA cases are
"that a claim was presented for payment by the government,
the claim was false or fraudulent, and the defendant knowingly
presented the claim or caused it to be presented for payment."33
The FCA allows a private individual to bring suit for a
violation of the Act for the individual and for the U.S. govern-
ment.34 The person bringing the suit, labeled a relator, must
28. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN.
5266, 5267 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. Those who have studied how much
public money is lost to fraud estimate the figures range from hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars to more than $50 billion per year. See id. at 3.
29. See id. Detected fraud, however, is an inaccurate measure of how
much fraud actually exists. See id.
30. See Robert L. Vogel, Citizens' Lawsuits Based on the False Claims Act
Have Multiplied, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26,1990, at 20,20. The FCA intended to cover
all fraudulent attempts to cause the government to pay out sums of money or
deliver property or services. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 9, reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. 5266, 5274. Each separate bill, voucher, or other false
payment demand constitutes a separate claim under the FCA. See id.
31 See Vogel, supra note 30, at 20.
32. See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976);
United States v. Ehrlich, 643 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1981).
33. Vogel, supra note 30, at 20; see 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). Civil liability is
imposed for persons who do any of the following:
(1) knowingly submit a false claim to the government; (2) knowingly
submit a false statement in support of a claim to the government; (3)
conspire to defraud the government regarding a claim; (4) deliver
property in inaccurate quantities or accept inaccurate receipts for
property with intent to defraud the government; (5) knowingly obtain
property from persons in the government who cannot lawfully sell or
pledge the property; and (6) knowingly submit a false record or
statement to conceal, avoid or decrease an obligation to pay money or
transmit property to the government.
Kenneth D. Brody, Recent Developments in the Area of "Qui Tam" Lawsuits: A
New Weapon for Challenging Those Who May Be Submitting False Claims to
the Government, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 592, 593-594 (1990).
,34. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). "The concept is simple: Discover someone
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file the complaint under seal and serve it upon the govern-
ment.35 The relator is entitled to a percentage of the proceeds
recovered from the action, an amount dependent on whether
the government intervenes or not. 6 The government is given
sixty days from the filing date to investigate the relator's claim
and decide whether to intervene and take primary responsibility
for the case." If the government proceeds with the action, it
has the primary responsibility for the prosecution.3" If the gov-
ernment declines to take over the litigation, the relator "shall
have the right to conduct the action."39 Regardless of whether
defrauding the government and the law empowers you to sue the wrongdoer
in the name of the United States." Steve France, The Private War on Penta-
gon Fraud, 76 A.B.A. J. 46, 46 (Mar. 1990); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) ("[Alnd
when a statute of the United States so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the United States."). Sec-
tion 3730(e) lists the circumstances under which qui tam actions are barred.
There are essentially four situations in which courts are prevented from
hearing qui tam actions: (1) when the action is brought by a former or present
member of the armed forces against a member of the armed forces arising out
of such person's service in the armed forces, see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1); (2)
when the action is brought against a member of Congress, member of the ju-
diciary, or senior executive branch official if the action is based on evidence
known to the government when the action was brought, see id. § 3730(e)(2)(A);
(3) when the action is based upon allegations or transactions that are the
subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in
which the government is already a party, see id. § 3730(e)(3); and (4) when the
action is based upon the public disclosure of allegations in a criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing, or any other public record, unless the action is
brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is the
original source of the information, see id. § 3730(4)(A).
35. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) ("A copy of the complaint and written dis-
closure of substantially all material evidence and information the person pos-
sesses shall be served on the Government pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.").
36. See id. § 3730(d)(1) (stating that if the Government proceeds with the
action, the qui tam plaintiff is subject to receive at least 15% but not more
than 25% of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim). If the gov-
ernment does not proceed with the action, the qui tam plaintiff "shall receive
an amount which the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil pen-
alty and damages." Id. § 3730 (d)(2) This amount shall no be less than 25% or
more than 30% of the proceeds of the action or settlement. See id. The rela-
tor is also entitled to attorney's fees. See id.; cf. id. § 3730(d)(3) (reducing the
share of the proceeds the qui tam plaintiff receives if the court determines the
action was brought by the person who violated the FCA); id. § 3730(d)(4)
(awarding the defendant attorney's fees if the claim of the relator is found to
be "frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harass-
ment").
37. See id. § 3730(b)(2); cf infra note 45 (discussing the scenario where
the government elects not to intervene).
38. See id. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1).
39. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
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the government intervenes, it retains the right to receive
pleadings and updates on the relator's case.4°
When the government proceeds with the action, the relator
still has the right to remain a party to the action,4' but the Act
ensures that the government is not bound by any actions of the
relator.42 In addition, even if the government declines to inter-
vene, the relator cannot dismiss the action without the consent
of the court and the Attorney General. 3 In the cases where the
government initially elects not to intervene in the action, the
court may permit an intervention at a later time upon a showing
of good cause.' When the relator proceeds with the action
alone, the Act is less clear what rights the relator retains while
pursuing the action.45
40. See id. ("If the Government so requests, it shall be served with copies
of all pleadings filed in the action and shall be supplied with copies of all
deposition transcripts (at the Governmenfs expense).").
41. See id. § 3730(c)(1); id. at § 3730(b)(4)(a) (permitting the government
to take over a filed qui tam action).
42. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (giving the government the right to dismiss the
action notwithstanding the objections of the relator); id. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (granting
the government the right to settle the action over the objections of the relator
so long as the court determines the settlement is fair); id. § 3730(c)(2)(C)(providing the government the authority to limit the relator's participation in
the action).
43. See id. § 3730(b)(1) (The action may be dismissed only if the court
and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their rea-
sons for consenting.").
44. See id. § 3730(c)(3); cf FED. R. COV. P. 24(a) (allowing anyone to inter-
vene in an action upon timely application when a statute confers an uncondi-
tional right or where the applicant claims an interest in the action); FED. R.
Civ. P. 24(b) (permitting intervention when a statute confers a conditional
right or the applicant's claim in the main action have a question of law or fact
in common). The government may also be given extensions on the time period
in which it must decide whether to intervene. See United States ex rel. Siller
v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1341 (4th Cir. 1994) (showing how
the government received eight extensions of time in which to consider
whether to intervene between Siller's filing of the lawsuit and the govern-
mengfs ultimate decision to intervene in the action).
45. Although the FCA prohibits the relator from dismissing the action
without the consent of the Attorney General, this provision has generated
much controversy in the courts. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Killingsworth
v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the consent
provision only applies during the initial 60-day period); Minotti v. Lensink,
895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that the consent provision applies
only in cases where the plaintiff seeks voluntary dismissal of the FCA action);
United States ex rel. Pedicone v. Mazak Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1350, 1352-53(S.D. Ohio 1992) (holding that the qui tam plaintiff can dismiss the action
without the consent of the Attorney General upon a finding that the plaintiff
has adequately represented the United States' interests); United States ex rel.
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A. THE QUI TAM PROVISION: A HISTORY OF CHANGES
The FCA's qui tam provision has a lengthy history, first
becoming remunerative under Abraham Lincoln and during
the Civil War.' The qui tam provision of the FCA was de-
signed to give individuals who have independent knowledge of
fraud47 committed against the government the power to sue
and recover part of the proceeds.48 The idea behind the provi-
sion was that individuals within the entity defrauding the gov-
ernment would have superior knowledge of fraud over that of
the Department of Justice.49 Thus, the qui tam provision works
to provide an incentive for private litigants to expose the fraud
and benefit from the recovery.5 0
Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co.,
811 F. Supp. 346, 347 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) ("[Olnce the United States declines to
intervene, the qui tam plaintiff has the right to conduct the action and dismiss
or settle the case without the consent of the Attorney General."). "Under cur-
rent law, the Government is barred from reentering the litigation once it has
declined to intervene during this initial [60-day] period." SENATE REPORT,
supra note 28, at 26. But see Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d
154, 160 (5th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that the government retains the right to
veto a voluntary settlement).
46. See John C. Kunich, Qui Tam: White Knight or Trojan Horse, 33 A.F.
L. REV. 31, 31-32 (1990) (linking the origin of FCA back to the Civil War when
uncontrollable fraud on the part of government contractors cheated the Union
out of much needed resources); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 8
(providing a historical background to the FCA); Evan Caminker, The Constitu-
tionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 349-50 (1989) (reviewing the
original motivations behind the passage of the qui tam provision); Valerie R.
Park, Note, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Relators, and the Government:
Which Is the Real Party to the Action?, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1991)
(stating Congress originally enacted the FCA as a response to the misuse of
federal funds during the Civil War).
47. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining the independent
knowledge requirement of the qui tam provision).
48. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
49. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.5 (1943)
("[Qui tam statutes are] passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as
modern civilization, that one of the least expensive and most effective means
of preventing frauds on the Treasury is to make the perpetrators of them li-
able to actions by private persons acting, if you please, under the strong
stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain."); United States ex rel. Kelly
v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 745 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that discovering
fraud is very difficult without the cooperation of those who are somehow in-
volved in the fraudulent activity). Despite the possibility of monetary gain for
the qui tam plaintiff, many individuals bringing suit under the FCA realize
the significance behind exposing fraud. See Kunich, supra note 46, at 31 (Trm
a qui tam relator and I'm here to help the government." (quoting an anony-
mous citizen)).
50. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 2 reprinted in U.S.C.C.AN.
5266, 5267 ("In the face of sophisticated and widespread fraud, the Committee
QUI TAM SUITS
The standards for determining who could bring a qui tam
action under the FCA have varied over time. Under the origi-
nal FCA enacted in 1863, the government had no right take
over an action brought by a qui tam plaintiff.5' Until 1943, es-
sentially anyone could originate a suit, based either on pri-
vately obtained or publicly available information of fraud.2 As
a result, qui tam plaintiffs started bringing suits based on in-
formation of fraud already known to the government.53 In the
face of widespread abuse of the provision,' the Act was
believes only a coordinated effort of both the Government and the citizenry
will decrease this wave of defrauding public funds. [This amendment] in-
creases incentives... for private individuals to bring suits on behalf of the
Government."); cf. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States as rel. Schumer, 117
S. Ct. 1871, 1877 (1997) (stating that qui tam plaintiffs are primarily moti-
vated to bring suit by the anticipation of monetary award rather than the
public good of recovery lost moneys for the government and taxpayers);
United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1212 (7th Cir.
1994) (explaining that the only motivation by the individual relator is to re-
cover a piece of the action given by statute); Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry
Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistle-
blowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 282 (1992) (stating
that rewards under the FCA are "significant given the fact that the Justice
Department has estimated fraud to be as much as ten percent of the federal
budget, or one hundred billion dollars a year"). "[S]uccessful whistleblowers
can come away multimillionaires." Id. In 1996, private citizens who brought
suits under the FCA won verdicts ranging from $1 million to $9 million. See
Pamela H. Bucy, Where to Turn in a Post-Punitive Damages World: The "Qui
Tam" Provisions of the False Claims Act, 58 ALA. LAW. 356, 356 (1997). For a
general discussion on the policy implications of providing a monetary award to
whistleblowers, see Sean Hamer, Lincoln's Law: Constitutional and Policy Is.
sues Posed by the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 89, 98-100 (1997).
51. See United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d
715, 721 (9th Cir. 1994); BLANCH, supra note 22, at 122.
52. See BLANCH, supra note 22, at 58-59.
53. See Robert Salcido, Screening Out Unworthy Whistleblower Actions:
An Historical Analysis of the Public Disclosure Jurisdictional Bar to Qui Tam
Actions Under the False Claims Act, 24 PUB. CONT. L.J. 237, 241 (1995)(reporting that beginning in the 1930s, relators began bringing lawsuits cop-
ied from preexisting indictment or ongoing congressional investigations).
54. The trend of bringing suits based on fraud already known to the gov-
ernment culminated with United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537(1943), where the Supreme Court held that the FCA permitted private per-
sons to bring suit even if they copied their complaint from an indictment and
had no original information regarding the defendant's wrongful conduct. See
id at 545-48. In a subsequent letter to a member of Congress, the Attorney
General summarized the harm of the Marcus decision by stating that the de-
cision created a "scramble among would-be informers' to see who can be the
first to file civil suit based on the charges in the [already filed] indictment." 89
CONG. REC. 7571 (1943). Bringing such suits against companies for millions
of dollars was considered a "disgrace to the Government." Id. at 7572. The
1998] 1365
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amended in 1943 to limit the circumstances under which an
individual could bring a qui tam action." The 1943 version of
the Act represented the government's belief that it could dis-
cover and prosecute fraud on its own. 6 Therefore, following the
1943 Amendments, the qui tam provision was scarcely utilized 7
After a flourishing federal budget deficit and continued ex-
tortion of government funds, Congress amended the FCA in
1986 with the stated intent of generating more private suits."
idea of allowing qui tam plaintiffs to base their suits off information already
within the knowledge of the government undermines the original intent of the
qui tam provision. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (asserting that
Government assumed qui tam plaintiffs would have superior knowledge of the
committed against it).
55. See BLANCH, supra note 22, at 58 (describing the 1943 Amendments
as Congress's attempt to prohibit qui tam actions that were based on infor-
mation already in the possession of the government when the action was
filed); Salcido, supra note 53, at 242 ("Congress acted immediately and deci-
sively after Marcus to amend the False Claims Act."). The original source re-
quirement is now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A):
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, adminis-
trative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by
the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original
source of the information.
Id.
56. See Francis E. Purcell, Jr., Comment, Qui Tam Suits Under the False
Claims Amendments Act of 1986: The Need for Clear Legislative Expression,
42 CATH. U.L. REv. 935, 942 (1993) (classifying the 1943 Amendments as sig-
naling Congress's belief that the federal government could handle false claims
without the assistance of private relators); Salcido, supra note 53, at 240-48
(giving a lengthy history of the 1943 amendments).
57. See Bucy, supra note 50, at 356 ("For a variety of reasons, the FCA
was not particularly effective until 1986."); Callahan & Dworkin, supra note
50, at 318 (noting that before the FCA was revised in 1986, qui tam actions
averaged about six per year); Caminker, supra note 46, at 343 ("Restrictive
statutory amendments and judicial interpretations of the Act drove qui tam
actions into a period of desuetude for much of this century.").
58. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 23 (describing the Committee's
overall intent in amending the qui tam section as to encourage more private
enforcement of fraud); Salcido, supra note 53, at 250-57 (providing historical
background of the 1986 amendments). "Faced with well-publicized reports of
$400 hammers and $600 toilet seats, Congress in 1986 turned to the whistle-
blower lawsuit as its chief weapon for fighting fraud in the defense industry."
Michael Waldman, Time to Blow the Whistle? 'Qui Tam' Lawsuits Are a Dou-
ble-Edged Sword: They Encourage Disclosure of Fraud but Can Poison Work-
place Relations and Be Used to Settle Employee Grudges, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25,
1991, at 13, 13. The 1986 Amendments were needed to break the "conspiracy
of silence" that had fallen upon employees who knew of government fraud, but
were reluctant to report it. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6. Workers
QUI TAM SUITS
The 1986 Amendments strengthened the position of the qui
tam plaintiff in three ways: (1) qui tam plaintiffs were given
more power to initiate and prosecute claims, (2) financial in-
centives were enhanced, and (3) protections against employer
retaliation reduced the risks inherent in exposing one's em-
ployer.59 As a result, filing a qui tam action immediately became a
lucrative business.6
B. INCREASED LrIGATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Courts have interpreted the effect of the 1986 amendments
on FCA litigation in different ways. One court identified the
1986 amendments as a continued extension of the executive
branch's control over qui tam suits.6" Another court concluded
that the 1986 amendments expanded the ability of relators to
bring suits and proceed with the suit in their own right.62 Re-
gardless of how the 1986 amendments are construed, a dra-
matic increase in the number of qui tam suits filed followed the
changes.63 After the 1986 Amendments, the term qui tam be-
in the defense industry (the biggest area of government fraud) believed there
was no encouragement or incentives to report fraud. See id. at 5.
59. See France, supra note 34, at 47.
60. See Waldman, supra note 58, at 13 (reporting that since October 1986,
nearly 280 qui tam suits had been filed and the qui tam plaintiffs had received
approximately $9 million in awards). The government reported the following
information at the end of 1995:
'Fiscal - No.of Recoveries'
Year "Cases (approximate)
1989 95 $32 million
1990 82 $40 million
1991 90 $36 million
1992 119 $124 million
1993 131 $193 million
1994 221 $379 million
1995 274 $243 million
See Anna Mae Walsh Burke, Qui Tam: Blowing the Whistle for Uncle Sam, 21
NovA. L. REV. 869, 870-871 (1997).
6L See United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F.
Supp. 1084, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (stating that the 1986 version continued
"the evolution of greater executive control over qui tam lawsuits").
62. See United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 963
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2550 (1996).
63. Whether Congress intended the exact consequences of the 1986
amendments is questionable, but the effect was clear-a tremendous prolif-
eration of fraud claims by private citizens. See Park, supra note 46, at 1062;
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came increasingly well-known to government contractors, their
employees, and their lawyers."
As a method of resistance against the influx of qui tam
suits, defendants began challenging the constitutionality of the
amended qui tam provision. Constitutional challenges came on
three different grounds.65 Defendants first asserted the qui
tam provision violated the separation of powers doctrine by de-
priving the executive of the ability to exercise discretion in en-
forcing the law." Second, defendants argued the qui tam pro-
vision violated the appointments clause by vesting
prosecutorial powers in individuals who were not appointed in
accordance with the clause.' Third, defendants attacked the
qui tam provision by alleging it violated the standing require-
ment of the Constitution because the qui tam plaintiff did not
suffer any injury-in-fact.6 8  Although the Supreme Court has
not directly ruled on the constitutionality of the qui tam provi-
sion,69 it has withstood all constitutional challenges,70 generally
see also Purcell, Jr., supra note 56, at 936 (stating that after the 1986
amendments, the civil recoveries under the FCA more than doubled).
64. See Vogel, supra note 30 (discussing the multiplication of lawsuits
based on the FCA after the 1986 Amendments).
65. See Caminker, supra note 46, at 344-48 (discussing the constitutional
issues surrounding the qui tam provision); Park, supra note 46, at 1073
(stating the specific constitutional challenges to the qui tam provision have
been brought under Article H, Article MI, and the separation of powers doc-
trine). But see BLANCH, supra note 22, at 98 (stating that all constitutional
problems with the FCA stem from the separation of powers issue).
66. See United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F.
Supp. 1084, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (stating the court must decide whether the
FCA "Impermissibly undermine[s]'" the powers of the executive or "'disrupts
the proper balance between the coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing] the Ex-
ecutive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions'"
(citations omitted)). For a general discussion on the constitutionality of the
qui tam provision in the context of Article H, see Ara Lovitt, Note, Fight For
Your Right to Litigate: Qui Tam, Article II, and the President, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 853 (1997) (arguing that the qui tam provision violates the separation of
powers doctrine).
67. See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 754-55 (9th
Cir. 1993) (examining whether the qui tam provisions constitute an imper-
missible delegation of Executive Branch power).
68. See United States ex rel. Burch v. Piqua Eng'g, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 115,
118-119 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (denying the defendants claim that the FCA is un-
constitutional because no case or controversy exists); e. Fleming v. United
States, 336 F.2d 475, 480 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 907 (1965)
(allowing the U.S. to recover under the FCA without any proof of damages).
For a general discussion on the standing issue of the qui tam provision, see
Thomas R. Lee, Comment, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the False
Claims Act, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 543 (1990).
69. The Supreme Court has strategically avoided a direct ruling on the
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on the assertion that the government is the true party to the
action, thus rendering all constitutional challenges void."
C. IMPLEMENTING THE 1986 AMENDMENTS:
EVOLVING INCONSISTENCIES
In resolving the diverse constitutional challenges to the
1986 Amendments, courts created additional confusion con-
cerning the roles of the qui tam plaintiff and the government in
a qui tam suit. Because the courts have used a number of dif-
ferent justifications for upholding the constitutionality of the
FCA, 2 developing a consistent interpretation of other FCA
constitutionality of the qui tam provision. See Harvey Berkman, Court Skips
Sticky Qui Tam Issues, NAT'L L.J., June 30, 1997, at 10, 10 (noting that the
high court avoided several "meaty" questions regarding the qui tam provi-
sion); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Hears Argument on Whistleblower Law-
suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at A21 (reporting that the Court limited their
review to avoid the constitutional issue raised by the defendant). The time for
a direct ruling, however, is past due. "There are just too many cases and
they're too conflicting not to go back up to the court soon." Berkman, supra
(quoting an attorney who practices in the area of FCA suits). Predictions are
that the Court will have at least one qui tam case before it every term for the
next several years. See id.; see also Charles Tiefer, Justices Ducked Major Is-
sue in "Hughes", NAT'L L.J., July 14, 1997, at 21, 21.
70. See Kelly, 9 F.3d at 743; United States ex rel. Madden v. General Dy-
namics Corp., 4 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Kreindler &
Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
508 U.S. 973 (1993); United States ex rel. Givler v. Smith, 775 F. Supp 172
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (all rejecting defendants' constitutional challenges to the
FCA). But see United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., No.
CIV.A.H-94-3996, 1997 WL 679105, at *8-9 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 1997) (mem.)
(granting defendant's motion to dismiss after finding that the qui tam plaintiff
suffered no injury-in-fact required by Article M of the Constitution). -This
decision is unlikely to stand as it "overturns more than 130 years of American
justice." Dean Starkman, Whistle-Blowers Can't File Fraud Suits for Gov-
ernment, Federal Judge Rules, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1997, at B12 (quoting the
qui tam plaintiffs lawyer who is appealing the decision).
71. See United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1213
(7th Cir. 1994) ("Once we accept the premise that the United States is the real
plaintiff in a qui tam action, it stands to reason that challenges to the stand-
ing of the government's representative are beside the point."); Kelly, 9 F.3d at
758 (linking the court's Appointment Clause and separation of powers analy-
sis to the fact that the Executive Branch retains sufficient control over the
action); cf United States ex rel. Yellowtail v. Little Horn State Bank, 828 F.
Supp. 780, 786 (D. Mont. 1992) (using the FCA's qui tam provision to justify
standing for the qui tam provision of 25 U.S.C. § 81).
72. See Burch, 803 F. Supp. at 119 (asserting qui tam plaintiffs have
standing based on the potential ramifications to their employment status by
reporting a violation of the FCA); United States ex rel. Trong v. Northrop
Corp., 728 F. Supp. 615, 618-19 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that the qui tam
plaintiff does not need injury-in-fact where there is tangible injury to the gov-
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provisions has been problematic. 3 The biggest problem for
courts has been to define the role of the relator in a manner that
maintains the constitutionality of the Act. 4 Since most consti-
tutional challenges have been defeated on the basis that the gov-
ernment is the true party to the action, the qui tam plaintiff has
been caught between the role of being the actual plaintiff in the
lawsuit and being considered a mere formality with few rights.
Congress has not stated whether a qui tam action should
be considered a suit by the government or by the qui tam
plaintiff.75 Thus, courts have struggled in determining who is
the real party pursuing the action. 6  The qui tam provision
states that the "action shall be brought in the name of the Gov-
ernment."" Such language suggests that the government is the
real party in the action. This conclusion is supported by the
common rebuttal to the constitutional challenge of standing:
that the real party in interest is the government, who sustains
injury-in-fact by being defrauded.78 Some courts, however, have
held that once the government declines to intervene in the initial
sixty-day period, the relator becomes the real party in interest.9
eminent); United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, 714 F. Supp.
1084, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (stating the qui tam plaintiff meets the standing
requirement because the FCA essentially creates a de facto assignment of a
portion of the governments interests in the action).
73. See supra note 45 (noting how the courts have struggled with inter-
preting the requirement that the Attorney General consent to dismissal as
well as the governments power to intervene in an action when the 60-day pe-
riod has elapsed).
74- See Vogel, supra note 30, at 20 (acknowledging how recent case law
has failed to alleviate, and in some cases has added to, the difficulty of defin-
ing the roles of the parties to FCA litigation).
75. See Park, supra note 46, at 1068.
76. See United States ex rel. Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d
1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Reasonable people could go either way on whether
the United States is a party, and have."); United States ex rel. Milam v. Uni-
versity of Tex., 961 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The issue then is simply
stated: is this a suit by the United States?"); Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100,
104 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the United States is always the real party in
interest in FCA qui tam actions).
77. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1); ef FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) ("Every action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.").
78. See supra, note 71 and accompanying text (contending once the Gov-
ernment is the party in interest, the standing issue becomes moot).
79. See Public Interest Bounty Hunters v. Board of Governors., 548 F.
Supp. 157, 161 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (stating that the United States itself is not a
party to a qui tam action in which it elects not to intervene); United States ex
rel. Petrofsky v. Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall, McCarthy, 588 F.2d 1327, 1329
(10th Cir. 1978) (per curium) (stating that after the 60-day period, the gov-
ernment's name in the action is merely a statutory formality). But see supra
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Determining who constitutes the real party to the action
also affects the separation of powers challenge to the qui tam
provision. Courts have dismissed this constitutional challenge
by stating that the executive branch maintains sufficient con-
trol over the action, and thus the relator does not interfere
with the executive enforcement power." Once the government
decides not to intervene, however, courts often view the qui
tam plaintiff as the litigant in control of the action." Thus, it
has become difficult to reconcile the notion that the qui tam
plaintiff controls the litigation while maintaining the executive
branch does not relinquish its authority over the action for
purposes of constitutionality.
The controversy of defining the real party in interest depends
on what Congress intended the government's role to be in the
action once declining to intervene in the initial sixty-day period.82
The opinions interpreting the government's decision not to pro-
ceed with the action are quite diverse. Courts have perceived
the Attorney General's refusal to enter the suit as "tantamount
to the consent of the District Attorney to dismiss the suit."83 In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit has stated, 'To hold that the gov-
ernment's initial decision not to take over the qui tam action is
the equivalent of its consent to a voluntary dismissal of a de-
fendant with prejudice would require us to ignore the plain
language of section 3730(b)(1)."1
note 76 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty courts have in de-
termining whether the United States is the true party in the qui tam action).
80. See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 751-53 (9th
Cir. 1993) (putting the qui tam provision to the separation of powers test as
dictated in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
81. See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P..
v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 811 F. Supp. 346, 347 (E.D. Tenn.
1992) (holding that once the United States decides not to intervene, the qui
tam plaintiff may conduct the action and dismiss or settle the case without
the consent of the Attorney General); Bounty Hunters, 548 F. Supp. at 161
(concluding that the cause of action belongs to the qui tam plaintiff, not the
United States).
82. Cf. Petrofsky, 588 F.2d at 1329 (observing that no clear precedent
supports a continuing governmental interest in qui tam suits after the United
States has declined to intervene).
83. United States ex rel. Laughlin v. Eicher, 56 F. Supp. 972, 973 (D.D.C.
1944). This language has been quoted in more recent decisions. See, e.g., Mi-
notti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 1990).
84. United States ex rel. McGough v. Covington Techs. Co., 967 F.2d
1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992).
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It is also unclear whether Congress intended the qui tam
suit to be a public lawsuit or one between private litigants.85
The question arises when courts are confronted with the ques-
tion of whether to apply procedural rules that govern litigation
when the government is a party to the action.86 If the action is
one between private litigants, this would bar both the qui tam
plaintiff and the defendant from using special rules that apply
only if the government were a party. Constitutional defenses
such as double jeopardy and excessive fines would presumably
not be available." Although the importance of this distinction
has been challenged,88 it is a useful analysis in solving the
problem of who controls an FCA lawsuit.89 If the suit is between
85. See Park, supra note 46, at 1070. Historically, the Supreme Court
has also strategically avoided this issue. See United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435,451 n.11 (1989) ("We express no opinion as to whether a qui tam ac-
tion, such as the one in Hess, is properly characterized as a suit between pri-
vate parties .... [We consider the issue unresolved."). Park asserts two
theories for solving the private/public problem. See Park, supra note 46, at
1070-1073. Under the litigation theory, the government has assigned its in-
terest in the claim to the relator, and this determines the "real party" issue.
See id. at 1070. Under the cause-of-action theory, the qui tam provision is
seen as an attempt to temporarily deputize private citizens as government
agents. See id. at 1071-72. For a general discussion on the consequences of
enabling private citizens to enforce federal regulatory statutes, see Richard B.
Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 1195 (1982).
86. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d
1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining the government is a party to the ac-
tion for purposes of FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)); Petrofsky, 588 F.2d at 1329
(holding that the 60-day period the government has in which to file an appeal
does not apply to a qui tam plaintiff); United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of
Green Bay, Wis., 924 F. Supp. 96, 97-98 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (deciding whether
the DOTs regulation governing testimony of employees in legal proceedings in
which the United States is a party applies to a qui tam action); see also
Bounty Hunters, 548 F. Supp. at 161 ("The False Claims Act itself thus pro-
vides clear evidence that a qui tam suit brought by a private informer in
which the United States elects not to intervene is qualitatively different from
one in which an appearance by the United States actually alters the identity
of the prosecuting party."); Park, supra note 46, at 1069 (contemplating the
results of a qui tam suit if Congress had explicitly provided that it is to be
treated as a suit between private parties for all purposes). The issue also
arises in the context of determining the applicability of sovereign immunity
when state institutions are charged with violating the FCA. See United
States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech. Univ., 980 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
87. See Park, supra note 46, at 1069.
88. See Caminker, supra note 46, at 346 (noting that the distinction be-
tween private and public representation is "conceptually infirm" because an
injury to the general public can easily be reconstrued as an injury to each in-
dividual member).
89. See Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am., Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir.
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two private parties, then the qui tam plaintiff must be consid-
ered the true party to the action. On the other hand, if the suit
is to be classified as a public action, the qui tam plaintiff be-
comes a mere formality to the lawsuit.
A slight conflict has always been present between the roles
of the relator and the government." Tensions between the gov-
ernment and the relator began with the "parasitic" qui tam
suit-when the relator would bring an action based on infor-
mation of fraud already within the knowledge of the governmentf1
Both the 1943 and 1986 Amendments attempted to curtail
such actions by including the requirement that the relator be
the original source of the fraudulent information. 2 Recently,
the government's concern has been over the ability of qui tam
plaintiffs to join pendent claims (such as wrongful discharge)
and attempt to manipulate the action to reduce the government's
recovery. 3 This has led to government efforts to block "unfair"
1997) (stating the FCA's structure "distinguishes between cases in which the
United States is an active participant and cases in which the United States is
a passive beneficiary of the relator's efforts"); United States ex rel. Hyatt v.
Northrop Corp., 91 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the distinctions
Congress made between the rights of the government and the rights of a qui
tam plaintiff in order to determine whether to apply a statutory tolling provi-
sion to the government); see also France, supra note 34, at 46 (saying that, in
effect, the FCA's qui tam provision "'privatizes' the governmentfs anti-civil
fraud function"). The qui tam plaintiff has even been classified as a private
attorney general See id. at 47.
90. See Richard W. Stevenson, A Whistle-Blower to Get $7.5 Million in
Big Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15, 1992, at Al (expressing the concerns of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) that the law encourages unwarranted suits
by gold-diggers); Rick Wartzman & Paul M. Barrett, For Whistle-Blowers,
Tune May Change, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 27, 1989, at BI (writing on whether the
DOJ will decide the "extra help" given by the qui tam provision in combating
fraud is a "royal pain"). See generally Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Set-
tling for Less: The Department of Justice's Command Performance Under the
1986 False Claims Amendment Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 409 (1993)
(discussing the DOJ's concerns with the 1986 amendments to the FCA).
91. See BLANCH, supra, note 22, at i47 (defining "parasitic" actions as
those which serve no real public interest but instead are pursued for the self-
interest of the relator); supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the
widespread abuse of the qui tam provision prior to the 1943 amendments).
92. See supra notes 55-56, 58-59 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 104 & 121 and accompanying text. The FCA itself
provides protection for employees who are subjected to adverse action for
bringing a FCA suit against their employer under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), which
provides:
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened,
harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms
and conditions of employment by his or her employer because of law-
ful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or others in
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settlements between the qui tam plaintiff and the defendant
regardless of whether it has intervened in the action or not. 4
D. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: DOES THE GOVERNMENT HAVE
ABSOLUTE POWER TO BLOCK QU TAM SEITLEMENTS?
Observing the difficulty courts have had in interpreting
and implementing the provisions of the FCA, not surprisingly,
the problem of defining the roles and rights of the qui tam
plaintiff and the government has come to a climax with a circuit
split. The qui tam provision requires that the relator obtain
the consent of the Attorney General before dismissal of the action. 5
In order to determine whether the government is able to block
settlements when it has not participated in the lawsuit, the
roles of the qui tam plaintiff and government need to be clearly
defined. Due to the conflicting interpretations and application
of the qui tam provision, the breadth of the consent requirement is
the subject of a recent split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.
E. THE KZLLINGSWORTH OPINION: THE GOVERNMENT'S
CONSENT IS NOT REQUIRED
The Ninth Circuit concluded in United States ex rel.
Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp. that the government does not
enjoy absolute power to intervene in a qui tam action.96 As a
defense contractor to the government, Northrop Corporation
improperly inflated cost estimates supporting MX missile con-
tract bids.97 As a result, Max Killingsworth brought a qui tam
action against Northrop alleging it had defrauded the govern-
furtherance of an action under this section... shall be entitled to all
relief necessary to make the employee whole. Such relief shall in-
clude reinstatement with the same seniority status... 2 times the
amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for
any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination....
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1994).
94. See Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 155 (5th Cir.
1997) (indicating the government objected to the settlement when it discov-
ered the qui tam plaintiff would receive 30% of the award plus attorney's
fees); cf 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (1994) (allowing the government to settle
the action if the court determines the proposal is fair). See generally William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 29 (1975) (stating that economists have long assumed that a principle
of private enforcement would fall short of its goal either because of free-rider
problems or because of economies of scale).
95. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1994).
96. See Killingsworth, 25 F.3d 715, 723 (9th Cir. 1994).
97. See id. at 718.
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ment 8 The government investigated the claim for almost
eighteen months, then declined to pursue the claim.99 Subse-
quently, the parties entered into a settlement of $500,000
which fell through due to a dispute over several issues.' °°
Killingsworth then amended his complaint to include wrongful
discharge.'0'
Eighteen months later, Killingsworth and Northrop at-
tempted again to settle the case.' 2 The settlement provided
that Northrop would pay $1 million for the FCA claim and $3.2
million for Killingsworth's wrongful discharge claim.103 The
government expressed concern with this agreement, noting
that the "bulk of the settlement" would go to the wrongful dis-
charge claim.' Although the government objected to the set-
tlement, it still declined to formally intervene in the action.105
Following the government's objection, Northrop and Killingsworth
agreed to shift $500,000 from the wrongful discharge claim to the
FCA claim.'°
Three and a half years after Killingsworth had commenced
the action, the government informed the court that it did not
consent to the settlement agreement, but again refused to file a
motion to intervene.' 7 Consequently, the court entered its or-
der of dismissal of the action with prejudice, stating that the
Attorney General's consent to dismissal in the current circum-
stances was not required. 8 The government then appealed to
the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit held that the govern-
ment's appeal was timely,1°9 but found that "the government's
98. See id. at 717.





104. See id. The government argued that the proposed settlement "reflects
a deliberate attempt by Northrop and Killingsworth to divert money from the
False Claims Act claim to Killingsworth's personal claim." Id. at 720. The
government also complained about Northrop's failure to pursue a statute of
limitations defense to the wrongful discharge claim which would have com-





109. See id. at 719. In determining whether the governmentfs motion to
appeal was timely, the court employed the test dictated in United States ex
rel. McGough v. Covington Techs. Co., 967 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1992).
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consent to dismissal is only required during the initial sixty-
day period" in which it must decide whether to intervene."'
Nonetheless, the court held that the FCA authorizes the dis-
trict court to ensure that the government receives its proper
share of the settlement as mandated by statute."'
F. THE SEARCY OPINION: THE GOVERNMENTS CONSENT IS
ABSOLUTE
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit held in
Searcy v. Philips Electronics North America Corp."2 that the
Attorney General maintains absolute power to veto voluntary
settlements."3 The court noted that most cases had only
"flirted" with the issue of defining the provision of the FCA
that requires the Attorney General's consent before dis-
nissal."' The Second Circuit interpreted the provision to ap-
ply only in cases where the plaintiff sought voluntary dismissal
of the claim."5 The Minotti court went on to comment, how-
ever, that once the United States declined to intervene in an
action, "little rationale" remained for requiring the consent of
the Attorney General before the action was dismissed."6 An-
other district court made a sweeping remark that "Congress
See Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 719. The test requires consideration of three
factors: (1) the stage of the proceeding at which the applicant seeks to inter-
vene; (2) the prejudice to the other parties; and (3) the reason for the delay.
See id. Because the court concluded that the government remains the real
party in interest even when it does not intervene within the 60-day period un-
der the statute, the governmentis motion survived the McGough test for time-
liness. See id. at 720.
110. See id. at 723.
11L See id. at 724; ef United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Suniland
Packing House Co., 912 F. Supp. 1325, 1338 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (considering the
intent behind the section of the FCA which gives the relater the right to object
to settlements proposed by the government). The history of 31 U.S.C. §
3730(c)(1) suggests the relator was given the right to object in order to "check
that the Government does not neglect evidence, cause undue delay, or drop
the false claims cases without legitimate reason." SENATE REPORT, supra
note 28, at 26, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CA.N. 5266, 5291.
112. 117 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1997).
113. See id. at 159-60. Furthermore, the court stated, [tjhe power to veto
voluntary settlements.., does not conflict with the relator's statutory right to
control the litigation when the government chooses to remain passive." Id.
114. See id. at 158.
115. See Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990).
116. See id. at 104 ("[Wle note that requiring the Attorney General's con-
sent before dismissal is particularly inappropriate in this case, in light of the
decision of the Attorney General ... to decline intervening or proceeding with
Minotti's claim on behalf of the Government.").
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did not intend to give the United States a veto power over ac-
tions in which it has previously declined to intervene."117 The
Ninth Circuit had previously held that the government's ap-
proval of a voluntary settlement is required where the relator
has failed to notify the government of the settlement terms.'
In Searcy, however, Bortner (the qui tam plaintiff) had fol-
lowed all statutory requirements for providing the government
with court documents pertaining to the suit."'
The proposed settlement allotted thirty percent of the pro-
ceeds to be paid directly to Bortner. 1° Fearing that Bortner
had manipulated the settlement, the government sought to in-
tervene after initially declining to pursue the suit against
Philips. 2' In holding that the government had absolute power
to intervene, the court stated that the Killingsworth decision
was "unpersuasive" and that the statutory language demanded
an opposite result." The court maintained that giving the
government the power to veto voluntary settlements did not
"conflict with the relator's statutory right to control the litiga-
tion."' Despite the intent of the qui tam provision,2 the
Searcy court stated that "intentions alone cannot work a repeal
of the last sentence of § 3730(b)(1)."'2
II. AN INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH TO DETERMINING
THE PARTIES' RIGHTS
In order to resolve the dispute over interpretation, it is
necessary to step back and analyze how the statutory text aids
in determining the rights and roles of the qui tam plaintiff and
the government. The language of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) does,
in fact, seem unambiguous when it states, "The action may be
dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give writ-
117. United States ex rel. Pedicone v. Mazak Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1350,
1352 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
118. See United States ex rel. McGough v. Covington Techs., Co., 967 F.2d
1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992).
119. See Searcy, 117 F.3d at 155.
120. See Order Approving Settlement, Awarding Proceeds, and Dismissing
Claims with Prejudice at 2, Searcy (No. 1:95CV363).
121. See Searcy, 117 F.3d at 155.
122. See id. at 159.
123. Id. at 160.
124 See supra notes 49-50 (declaring the qui tam provision was created to
encourage private citizens to report fraud).
125. Searcy, 117 F.3d at 159.
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ten consent to the dismissal and their reason for consenting."'26
When combined with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3), which allows the
government to intervene in the action upon a showing of good
cause,27 it seems correct to hold the government can intervene
and prevent a settlement between the qui tam plaintiff and the
defendant at any time. The government does not fulfill the
"good cause" standard, however, by simply showing it has been
overburdened by some aspect of the relator's case." Thus,
combining the text of these two provisions does not fully sup-
port the conclusion that the government has the absolute right
to block proposed settlements between the qui tam plaintiff
and the defendant.
The best reasoning for concluding that the government
does not have an absolute right to intervene and block a set-
tlement is arguing that the language of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)
applies "only to cases in which a plaintiff.., sought to with-
draw an action before the United States had opportunity to as-
sess its merits or intervene in its conduct."' This rationale is
essentially the same as the holding of the Ninth Circuit in
Killingsworth-that the consent provision only applies to the
sixty-day period in which the government must decide whether
to intervene.30 On the one hand, this method of interpretation
seems consistent with the way these two provisions are writ-
ten. The sixty-day provision' does not come until after the
consent requirement in the text of the statute, 2 thereby sug-
gesting Congress's intent to limit the time period in which the
126. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1994).
127. See id. § 3730(c)(3).
128. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 25.
129. Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990). The court's spe-
cific holding stated that the consent provision only applies where the plaintiff
seeks voluntary dismissal of the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 41(a), and not where the court orders dismissal. See id.
130. See, e.g., Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 722. The court, however, took an-
other provision of the FCA as allowing the government to intervene after the
initial 60-day period upon a showing of good cause. See id. at 724 (citing 31
U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3), which permits the government to intervene at a later date
upon showing of good cause); cf. United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9
F.3d 743, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Several of the control mechanisms built into
the qui tam provisions are qualified.... [T]he government must show "good
cause" in order to intervene in an action which has already commenced.").
131. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). Furthermore, "the term 'intervention' as
used in § 3730(b)(2) is accompanied by the phrase 'and proceed with the action,'"
thus referring "to the government's privilege of interceding and becoming a liti-
gant in the action within the sixty-days." See Kllingsworth, 25 F.3d at 722.
132. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
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Attorney General's consent is needed.'33 On the other hand,
the two provisions can also be read as entirely distinct, indicat-
ing an intent that the consent requirement be enforced even af-
ter the initial sixty-day period. When read in the context of the
whole statute, it appears the consent provision was included as
a method of ensuring that the government had an opportunity
to evaluate the merits of the qui tam plaintiff's claim before the
parties settled." Central to the structure of the qui tam pro-
vision is the option retained by the government to conduct an
action brought by a private person.'35 The consent provision
guarantees that legitimate claims are not dismissed before the
government has been notified and given an opportunity to pro-
ceed with the action.'36 The provision does not suggest that the
government possesses absolute power to block settlements be-
tween the qui tam plaintiff and the defendant.
Another obstacle to determining the respective roles of the
government and the relator under the FCA is 31 U.S.C. §
3730(c)(3), which states, "If the Government elects not to pro-
ceed with the action, the person who initiated the action shall
have the right to conduct the action."137 On one hand, this lan-
guage could be interpreted as giving the qui tam plaintiff all
the benefits of a private litigant once the government declines
to intervene, including the right to be free from objections from
outside parties. On the other hand, the qui tam provision con-
133. Stated the Killingsworth court:
The language in the statute requiring both the government and
the court to consent to a dismissal came from the initial qui tam
statute of 1863. The format and intent of the amended statute, how-
ever, do not preserve the governmentfs absolute right to bar a dis-
missal without intervention except during the first sixty days plus
any extension granted after the private person has filed a qui tam
complaint.
25 F.3d at 722.
134. See Minotti, 895 F.2d at 103; United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons,
Gerlin & Bustamante v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 811 F. Supp.
346, 347 (E.D. Tenn. 1992). "Keeping the qui tam plaintiff under seal for the
initial 60-day time period is intended to allow the Government an adequate
opportunity to fully evaluate the private enforcement suit ... P SENATE
REPORT, supra note 28, at 24. The Senate Report goes on to say that, under
the consent provision, the purposes of the qui tam relator are balanced with
the government's needs by allowing the relator to start the judicial process
while protecting his own litigative rights. See id. By providing for sealed
complaints, the Government is prevented from bringing suit first, and thus
barring the qui tam plaintiff. See id.
135. See Minotti, 895 F.2d at 104.
136. See supra note 134.
137. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
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tains substantial language clearly limiting the relator's role in
the qui tam action.' The provisions limiting the relator's
power, however, are qualified to when the government inter-
venes in the initial sixty-day period. Therefore, whether the
same provisions apply after the qui tam plaintiff has proceeded
with the action remains unanswered. It could be argued that if
Congress wanted the government to have particular powers
when the qui tam plaintiff proceeded with the action, it could
have provided so in a separate provision. '39
The language of the FCA clearly states that qui tam suits
are "brought in the name of the government."'14 The courts' use
of this statutory language to assist in defining the parties' roles
is often unpersuasive, because whether the government is seen
as a true party to the action generally depends on what benefit
would be afforded to the qui tam plaintiff. For example, if
viewing the government as a party would extend a benefit to
the qui tam plaintiff typically reserved for the government
(such as enjoying an extended period in which to appeal), the
government is not seen as a party.41 Moreover, if being a party
to the action would be adverse to the government's interests,
the government usually seeks exclusion from the action.'42
138. See supra note 42 (discussing the specific statutory provisions).
139. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) ('[Wlhere
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statue but omits it
in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.m
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))); cf United States
ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp., 91 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 1996) ("If Con-
gress wanted to restrict the operation of the tolling provision to suits brought
by the government, it could easily have done so.").
140. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
141. See Searcy v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am., 117 F.3d 154, 155 (5th Cir. 1997)
("The government reminded Bortner's counsel as a matter of course that it
was not a party and that discovery of government documents would have to
proceed by subpoena under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45."); United States ex rel. Petrof-
sky v. VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall, McCarthy, 588 F.2d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir.
1978) (stating that for purposes of enjoying the extended 60-day period in
which to appeal, after the government did not intervene, "It was clear at that
time the United States would not participate in the suit and that proceeding
in its name was merely a statutory formality" and therefore the qui tam
plaintiff only had 30 days to appeal). But cf supra note 71 and accompanying
text (explaining how the constitutional challenge of standing is answered by
holding that the government is the real party in interest).
142. For example, in Public Interest Bounty Hunters v. Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, the government sought to be excluded from the
action to avoid assessment of attorney's fees. See 548 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ga.
1982). The qui tam plaintiff tried to argue that the government was the true
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1998] QUI TAM SUITS 1381
When attempting to define the parties' rights in the context of
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3),'" the issue becomes even more compli-
cated for the courts. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quire that the action be prosecuted by the real party in inter-
est.1 " With the qui tam provision, the relator is prosecuting
the action, while the government contends it remains the real
party in interest.' 45 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vide an exception to the "party in interest" rule when a statute
provides that the action be brought in the name of the United
States.'4 But neither the FCA nor the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure answer the practical question of this arrangement:
Who is in charge?
By clearly defining the roles of the qui tam plaintiff and
the government under the FCA, courts can determine what
rights each party possesses in a such an action. Unfortunately,
the courts will probably need to look some place other than the
actual text for guidance.' 47 Although the Searcy court deter-
mined that the consent provision unequivocally gave the gov-
ernment absolute power to block settlements between the qui
tam plaintiff and the defendant,'" when interpreted within the
whole statute and the purpose of the qui tam provision, 49 it is
not consistent to hold that the government has absolute power
in every aspect of a qui tam suit.'50 The relator and the gov-
party in interest for purposes of assessing attorney's fees. See id. 160. The
court held that the Bounty Hunters's argument was "contrary to the plain
meaning of the language of the False Claims Act, as well as to the cases con-
struing this Act and similar qui tam provisions." Id. at 161. The court even
went as far as to state that the qui tam plaintiff becomes the party aggrieved
by defendants' alleged behavior who has "suffered 'injury' of the constitutional
magnitude required to confer upon him a claim against defendants." Id. In In
re Schimmels, the government argued that its interests in a qui tam action
diverge from those of the relator to avoid the default judgment imposed on the
relator. 127 F.3d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1997). To avoid the default judgment the
government asserted that it was a non-party, and thus enforcing the judg-
ment against the government would violate due process. See id. at 885. De-
spite the government's arguments, the court maintained it was the real party
in interest, and therefore affirmed the default judgment. See id.
143. See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
144. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a).
145. See supra notes 71, 76, 142 (referencing cases which hold the govern-
ment is the real party in interest in qui tam suits).
146. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
147. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
148. See Searcy v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 159 (5th Cir.
1997).
149. See supra notes 50, 58 and accompanying text.
150. See United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d
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ernment should be working toward a common goal-combating
fraud. If courts give the government an unequal amount of
power and allow it to completely block the relator's proposed
settlement as in Searcy, the parties are forced into a position
that dissolves the common goal. 5 ' In fact, often the qui tam
plaintiff and the defendant take sides against the government
in seeking to enforce the proposed settlement.'52 This situation
is not consistent with the purposes behind the FCA.53 There-
fore, courts must find an intermediary ground that is consis-
tent with the language and the spirit of the qui tam provision.
I. A THREAT TO THE QUI TAM PROVISION:
SEARCY FOLLOWED
Not only is the Searcy approach flawed as a matter of
statutory interpretation, it also has the potential to signifi-
cantly undermine the policies of the qui tam provision. Suits
under the FCA became scarce when the courts attempted to re-
strict the qui tam provision of the Act,' leading Congress to
enact the 1986 amendments to reverse these restrictions. The
pendulum could return to the pre-1986 state if courts follow
the Searcy opinion. Requiring governmental consent for all
settlements between parties in a qui tam suit is contrary to the
purpose of the provision'55 and encroaches upon the relator's
right to control the action.'56 From the origin of the qui tam
provision, Congress realized the relator must have some in-
centive in order to expose the fraud being perpetrated on the
government.'57 Suits under the FCA become very expensive
715, 722 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Congress' intent to place full responsibility for False
Claims Act litigation on private parties, absent early intervention by the gov-
ernment or later intervention for good cause, is fundamentally inconsistent
with the asserted 'absolute' right of the government to block settlement and
force a private party to continue litigation.").
15L See Tomain, supra note 23, at 300 (stating the government's position
is often antagonistic to the qui tam plaintiff).
152. See, e.g., Searcy, 117 F.3d at 155 (describing the conflicts that arose
between the qui tam plaintiff and the government); Tomain, supra note 23, at
300-01 (showing how attorneys who represent relators are often fighting two
battles--one against the defendant and the other against the government).
153. See supra note 50.
154 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 81 (citing cases that hold the relator has the right to
conduct the action after the government declines to pursue the claim).
157. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
1382 [Vol. 82:1357
QUI TAM SUITS
and time consuming. 58  If the government is permitted to
abuse its position in qui tam actions by barring a settlement
after a private plaintiff has invested substantial resources in
the litigation, it is unlikely future plaintiffs will be motivated
to bring suit and expose fraudulent conduct.' 59
The provisions of the FCA already provide the government
with ample opportunity to evaluate the merits of the relator's
claim and decide whether to bear the burdens of litigation it-
self.'6 In addition, the FCA contains provisions which punish
the relator if the relator's claim is found to be frivolous or
brought for an improper purpose.161 By agreeing to a settle-
ment, the qui tam plaintiff is deciding that he or she is ready to
end the litigation.162 This decision is often made after the rela-
tor has dealt with the suit for years. 63 No other outside party
could intervene and prevent the settlement at this point'6-
158. See infra note 170.
159. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 50, at 276-292 (assessing the fi-
nancial incentives to foster whistleblowing by using social-psychological lit-
erature). Callahan and Dworkin state that in all Congress's efforts to spur
whistleblowing, "the most significant recoveries by whistleblowers are likely
to be made under the federal False Claims Act." Id. at 281. Reward programs
are methods of providing significant monetary awards to advocate whistle-
blowing. See id. at 278. The reward program under the FCA is unique be-
cause it must be aggressively pursued, contrary to other forms of reward sys-
tems. See id. at 294. It seems clear that the anticipation of a monetary award
will often spur whistleblowing for those who would have otherwise remained
silent. See id. at 296. "The provisions of the False Claims Act allowing a
whistleblower to share in the recovery provided me with both the incentive
and the confidence to take on a matter which otherwise would have been too
overwhelming for one person to pursue.'" Stevenson, supra note 90, at Al
(quoting a qui tam plaintiff).
160. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 36. Congress specifically added the provision award-
ing prevailing defendants attorney's fees at the cost of the qui tam plaintiff
who brings a frivolous suit in order to create a strong disincentive to those
who might consider using the FCA for illegitimate purposes. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 28, at 29; see also infra note 197 (citing the provision
which reduces relator's recovery if the relator himself violates the provisions
of the FCA).
162. See infra text accompanying notes 166-168 (presenting the problem of
who pursues the litigation after the qui tam plaintiff wishes to settle the case
and the government intervenes).
163. See supra text accompanying note 107.
164. See supra note 44. The theory behind Rule 24 is that the interests of
the party seeking to intervene are not adequately represented by the current
parties to the action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (stating intervention should be
granted unless the applicant's interests are adequately represented by exist-
ing parties). The theory underlying the qui tam provision is that the plaintiff
is representing the governments interests. See supra note 34. Moreover,
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and nothing in the FCA gives the government the absolute
power to do so. Although the government deserves the ability
to ensure the legitimacy of the relator's suit, there are better
ways to appease the government's concerns other than the so-
lution found in Searcy.'65
Killingsworth addressed a practical problem in applying
the Searcy approach. The Kilingsworth court noted that at the
time the government sought to block the settlement between
the qui tam plaintiff and the defendant, neither the govern-
ment nor the relator wanted to engage in further litigation.'1
Presumably, if the government was interested in the litigation,
it would have intervened initially. Although the language of
the FCA gives the government substantial powers over the qui
tam action, 67 it does not specify the procedural effect of the
government exercising those powers when the government did
not initially intervene.6 8 A reasonable question then arises if
Searcy is followed: Who continues with the action if the gov-
ernment is allowed to block the settlement?
Most often, the government does not intervene because
doing so would not be financially beneficial. 69 Conducting a
successful qui tam action when the government does not inter-
vene is generally very time consuming and expensive for the
qui tam plaintiff. 71 Probably one of the biggest drawbacks of
both provisions of Rule 24 state the intervention must be "timely." See FED.
R. CiV. P. 24(A)-(B). It is debatable whether an intervention to block a nego-
tiated settlement should be considered 'timely." But see supra notes 15, 109
(citing the Searcy and Killingsworth decisions in which the court determined
the intervention by the government to object to the settlement was timely).
165. See infra Part IV.
166. See United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d
715, 723 (9th Cir. 1994). In explaining why it did not intervene in
Killingsworth's claim initially, the government admitted it sought to avoid the
burdens of litigation. See id. at 720.
167. See supra note 42.
168. See supra text accompanying note 139.
169. See United States ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of
Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1458 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting how the government did not
intervene because it speculated that the costs of proceeding on Berge's claims
outweighed the anticipated benefits). At the trial level, the jury ended up
awarding the United States $1.66 million. See id. at 1455. Ultimately, how-
ever, the Fourth Circuit ruled that Berge's claim was preempted by federal
copyright law and reversed the district court's decision denying the defen-
dant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 1465.
170. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 50, at 326 As early as 1986, liti-
gation costs for relators were estimated to reach as high as $700,000. See id.
at 32 n.212. One attorney litigating an FCA suit against McDonnell Douglas
and its subsidiary Hughes Helicopter in 1993 calculated his attorney's fees as
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the FCA's structure is the time it takes between reporting the
fraud and when the relator receives the reward.' 7' Although by
settling the action the relator may receive less money than if
he had proceeded to trial, the reward of prompt payment may
outweigh the difference in the amount recovered. 72 Therefore,
if the government is allowed to block settlements and essentially
force the relator to proceed to trial, it may be removing a valuable
incentive for future relators to bring an action under the FCA.lu
The time and money spent by the qui tam relator are not
the only costs such plaintiffs incur. Most qui tam actions are
brought by employees of the entity defrauding the government.
By exposing their employer's wrongdoing, these people stand to
lose their job, ruin their reputation at work, and bear the label
of "whistleblower,' 74 which might inhibit future employment.
approaching $3 million. See Gail Diane Cox, Qui Tam Suit Is Heavy on Tech-
nicalities, NATL L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at 8, 8. Moreover, the government does
not assist the qui tam plaintiff with the costs of proceeding with the action.
As stated in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(f), "The Government is not liable for expenses
which a person incurs in bringing an action under this section." Therefore,
"[h]istory has shown that relators fare better when the government joins the
FCA action as co-plaintiff." Bucy, supra note 50, at 357.
171. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 50, at 315.
172. See id. at 316.
173. See, e.g., id. at 297-98 (arguing that money will not serve as an incen-
tive when it is unclear what type of conduct will be rewarded). Faced with the
possibility of getting forced into a position similar to the plaintiff in Searcy,
relators are unlikely to be motivated to bring FCA suits purely for the mone-
tary reward when they are unsure about their rights in pursuing an action
under the qui tam provision. See United States ex rel. Haycock v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 1996) (remarking that it matters a
"great deal" that the qui tam plaintiff be able to figure out easily which time
period applies in which he or she has to appeal). In addition, the research
behind whistleblowing indicates that a monetary award is rarely the sole mo-
tivating factor in a decision to report wrongful activity. See Hainer, supra
note 50, at 98-100.
174. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 50, at 314 (listing the personal
and professional penalties whistleblowers can incur, such as discharge, failure
to achieve promotion, blackballing, and social ostracism, as well as health and
family problems caused by stress from these various forms of retaliation). An
employee who had "blown the whistle" on his employer describes how he was
treated by his employer subsequent to the reporting:
They reacted angrily, calling me anti-management.... Gradually, I
was squeezed out of the work I was doing.... I was excluded from
meetings and was put to work doing menial tasks outside my job de-
scription, such as sweeping, making coffee and cleaning a 50 gallon
coffee pot.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 5. In addition to infecting employee-
employer relations with antagonism and suspicion, whistleblower lawsuits
have also damaged relations among employees themselves. See Waldman,
supra note 58, at 13 ("An existing atmosphere of cooperation and trust is
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Some courts have viewed these collateral consequences for the
qui tam plaintiff as sufficient enough to warrant injury-in-fact
for standing purposes. 75 Allowing the government absolute
power to block settlements between the qui tam plaintiff and
the defendant indicates the government is unsympathetic to
the burdens the relator has incurred in bringing the lawsuit. 76
If the government portrays its interests as adverse to the qui
tam plaintiff, future plaintiffs will be reluctant to assist the
government in combating fraud.
The employer's reaction to the growth in qui tam suits may
also present problems for its continued use. The qui tam pro-
vision can threaten the viability of an organization that is
prosecuted under the FCA and subjected to overwhelming civil
fines and penalties.1 77 A typical employer response to the qui
tam provision of the FCA has been to create its own internal
whistleblowing procedures. 78 This has created a conflict of in-
terest for potential qui tam plaintiffs-whether to maximize
their economic interests by reporting the fraud outside the organi-
zation, or to help protect the organization's interest by making an
internal disclosure of the fraud.1 79 If the FCA starts to lose its
appeal, more and more employees may forgo the qui tam provision
for continued job security and even an enhanced reputation
within the organization. Although this method of exposure-
i.e., internal procedures-still uncovers fraud, it does not punish
the entity as would the FCA 8 ° Faced with this possibility, the
courts must be even more reluctant to limit the relator's rights
while increasing the government's power in a qui tam action. 8'
sometimes replaced by suspicion that co-workers may be gathering evidence
and implicating their colleagues.").
175. See supra note 72.
176. See supra note 174 and accompanying text; see also SENATE REPORT,
supra note 28, at 5 (reporting that fear of reprisal was the second most cited
reason given by employees for not reporting fraud).
177. See Hamer, supra note 50, at 100.
178. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 50, at 335; Hamer, supra note
50, at 100-01.
179. See Hamer, supra note 50, at 100.
180. By reporting the fraud via the internal reporting system, the wrong-
doing may be corrected, but the organization remains largely unharmed. See
Hamer, supra note 50, at 101.
181. Callahan and Dworkin even go so far in their article to question
whether any amount of monetary award will be enough to offset the potential
ramifications a qui tam suit has in the workplace. See Callahan & Dworkin, su-
pra note 50 at 336. ("Are the gains worth the price? A few more millionaires,
and a few million dollars for the federal treasury are probably not worth the loss of
trust and atmosphere of cooperation."). Moreover, the research behind whistle-
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The Searcy opinion can be seen as the final clash in de-
termining who controls the qui tam litigation, as well as who
constitutes the real parties to the action. Although the consent
provision has its valid justifications,'82 if abused, it could be
seen solely as a method for the government to impound on the
relator's rights. Remembering that the relator has funded the
litigation by his or her own personal resources,'83 the Searcy
decision could lead to unfair results for the relator who is
forced to proceed with the action when he or she wishes to settle.
Congress created the qui tam provision to encourage suits by
private litigants.14 Relators may soon be discouraged, how-
ever, if they are forced into full-fledged trials which become ex-
pensive and time consuming.
IV. BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF THE GOVERNMENT
AND THE QUI TAM PLAINTIFF
If the government wants the qui tam provision to remain
useful, the courts must find a satisfactory solution for the ten-
sions that have been created between the government and the
qui tam plaintiff. Fraud on the government is not likely to
cease, and the government should recognize from past experience
that it is unable to combat fraud on its own.'85 In addition to
depleting government money, fraud erodes public confidence in
the government's ability to manage its own programs efficiently. 86
Therefore, it is essential that common ground be reached in in-
terpreting the FCA to combat this widespread problem.'87
The most effective compromise seems to be the Ninth Cir-
cuit's approach. While holding that the government is the real
party in interest, the court nevertheless limited the govern-
ment's ability to block the settlement by requiring it to seek
court review of the proposed settlement.'88 This court review of
blowing indicates that a monetary award is rarely the sole motivating factor in a
decision to report wrongful activity. See Hamer, supra note 50, at 100.
182. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (stating the consent provi-
sion was meant to ensure the government could evaluate the merits of the
relators claim before dismissal).
183. See supra note 170.
184. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 30.
185. See supra note 58.
186. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 4.
187. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
188. See United States ex rel. Kilingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d
715, 720 (9th Cir. 1994); cf United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sun-
land Packing House Co., 912 F. Supp. 1325, 1338-39 (E.D. Cal. 1995)
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the proposed settlement serves the purpose of determining
whether the provisions of the settlement improperly allocate
funds to the relator which should be paid to the government."9
With this arrangement, the government does not impede upon
the rights of the relator after the relator has borne the burdens
of bringing the action and pursuing the litigation. The gov-
ernment's ability to block the settlement between the qui tam
plaintiff and the defendant is not absolute; nonetheless, the
government is assured the settlement will be fair. 190
The FCA does not specifically address the government's
rights when the relator and the defendant arrive at a settle-
ment. '9 The language of the FCA explicitly gives the relator
the right to conduct the action, 9 2 which surely includes the
right to negotiate a settlement with the defendant.'93 In the
section of the FCA that addresses the allocation of recovery,
the statute recognizes the relator's right to settle the action.'94
Thus, in addition to being consistent with the intent of the qui
tam provision and general notions of fairness, refusing to give
the government absolute power over any aspect of a relator's
case is compatible with the plain language of the FCA. As
noted by the court in Killingsworth, "The statutory scheme of
the False Claims Act provides protection for the rights of both
the relator and the government." 95 Therefore, it seems illogical
to give one of the parties absolute power over any aspect of the
litigation.
Allowing the court to decide the fairness of the settlement
proposal between the qui tam plaintiff and the defendant is
also supported by the language of the FCA. The Act gives the
court the power to determine whether the settlement is fair
(considering the conditions upon which the relator was entitled to a hearing if
the government moved to dismiss or settle the action, but the relator wished
to proceed). The court required a hearing to determine if the governmenfs
purpose in dismissal is rationally related to a legitimate governmental pur-
pose and that the dismissal is not arbitrary, fraudulent, or illegal. See id. at
1340.
189. See Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 720.
190. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
191. See Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 723.
192. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (1994).
193. See Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 722.
194. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2). ("if the Government does not proceed with
an action under this section, the person bringing the action or settling the
claim shall receive an amount which the court decides is reasonable for col-
lecting the civil penalty and damages." (emphasis added)).
195. Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 720.
1388 [Vol. 82:1357
when the government seeks to dismiss or settle the action.'96 In
addition, the court has the power, under certain circumstances,
to fix the amount of the recovery that the qui tam plaintiff re-
ceives.19' The Killingsworth court interpreted this provision as
indicating Congress's intent that courts have the duty to en-
sure that qui tam plaintiffs do not manipulate suits in a way to
reduce the government's settlement.'8 This solution resolves
the concerns of both the government and the qui tam plaintiff.
First, the government is assured that relators will not have the
power to exploit their position in FCA actions and abate the
government's recovery because the courts will be guaranteeing
the fairness of the settlement.'1 Second, qui tam plaintiffs can
expect that, as long as they proceed in a proper manner, their
rights as the party pursuing the action will not be thwarted by
the government. °
The Ninth Circuit's solution also allows for resolution of
the different explanations courts have used for upholding the
constitutionality of the qui tam provision. 0' By ruling on the
validity of a proposed settlement, the court acknowledges that
the relator maintains substantial interest in the outcome of the
suit2 2 while recognizing that the government is the party who
has sustained the actual injury of being defrauded. 3 The
court is able to give the language "the action shall be brought
in the name of the government" full effect without neglecting
the relator's rights as the party conducting the action.2 14 The
196. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (1994) ("The government may settle the
action with the defendant notwithstanding the objections of the person initiat-
ing the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed set-
tlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances."
(emphasis added)). For a case interpreting the breadth of this provision, see
United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co., 912
F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
197. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (stating that if the court finds that the ac-
tion was brought by a person who violated the terms of the FCA himself, the
court may reduce the relator's share of the proceeds).
198. See Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 724.
199. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (discussing the prob-
lems the courts have had in defining who is the primary litigant in an FCA
suit).
203. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining how the stand-
ing challenge is solved by contending the United States is the real plaintiff in
a qui tam action).
204 See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text. Allowing the court
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court reminds the relator of the government's presence in the
litigation while recognizing the efforts the relator has made in
bringing the action."5 Thus, the tensions are relieved between
the qui tam plaintiff and the government.26 The court becomes
the intermediary and decides what is fair for purposes of the
FCA,0 7 instead of choosing between the rights of the qui tam
relator or the government.
CONCLUSION
Courts faced with deciding the roles of the government and
qui tam plaintiff in an FCA action should be reluctant to grant
the government absolute rights in any aspect when it has de-
clined to intervene in the initial stages of the action. The
structure of the FCA gives the government ample opportunity
to evaluate the validity of the qui tam plaintiffs action at the
beginning of the proceeding. Although the court should not
permit qui tam plaintiffs to manipulate their position, the gov-
ernment should not be given absolute power to intervene at the
finishing stages of the action.
The structure of the qui tam provision was designed to en-
courage private individuals to expose and prosecute those who
defraud the government. These ideals are thwarted by allow-
ing the government to scrutinize the qui tam plaintiff at every
stage in the action and object to the methods used to prosecute
the defendant. Providing the government the opportunity for a
review of proposed settlements by the court is the best method
of keeping the tensions between the qui tam plaintiff and the
government at bay while recognizing that both parties have an
interest in the ultimate outcome of the case.
to rule on the validity of the relator's settlement, however, does not resolve
the question of whether a qui tam action is one between private litigants or
one between the government and a private litigant for purposes of applying
special procedural rules and immunity. See supra notes 85-86.
205. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussing the separa-
tion of powers issue).
206. See supra note 23 (explaining the strains between the relator and the
government); supra text accompanying notes 90-94 (reviewing how tensions
have been created between the government and the qui tam plaintiff).
207. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (examining how the
FCA was formulated and designed to allow "private" prosecution of govern-
ment fraud).
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